

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO , MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: NEXT STEPS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION

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BELOW IS THE US PAPER BEING USED AS THE BASIS FOR OUR
DISCUSSION WITH FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH ON
MAY 3. EMBASSY BONN SHOULD DELIVER IT TO APPROPRIATE FRG
OFFICIALS. EMBASSY LONDON MAY PASS IT TO APPROPRIATE UK
OFFICIALS FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

I. GENERAL POINTS

-----A. NEED TO HAVE AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON MANPOWER
DATA

-----1. A MEANINGFUL REDUCTION AGREEMENT NEEDS TO INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS OF RESIDUAL LEVELS AS WELL AS ON THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS- IN TURN, AGREED LIMITATIONS ON REMAINING MANPOWER REQUIRE EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITIONS OF THE MANPOWER LIMITED AND ON ITS SIZE.

-----2. IF AGREEMENTS WERE NOT BASED ON AGREED DATA, WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION WOULD REACT ADVERSELY TO SUCH AGREEMENTS AND THEY COULD BE A SOURCE OF CONTINUAL EAST-WEST FRICTION. MOREOVER, THE WEST NEEDS

CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATIONS TO WHICH IT CAN PROVE IT HAS ADHERED IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY RESIST POSSIBLE EASTERN EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT TO INTERFERE WITH WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS.

----B. TACTICAL NEED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE EAST ON EXAMINATION OF MANPOWER DATA

-----3. THE EAST HAS SHIFTED FROM A DEFENSIVE TO AN OFFENSIVE POSITION ON MANPOWER DATA. THE FIRST EASTERN POSITION WAS A REFUSAL TO TABLE DATA ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION PRINCIPLES. THEN, AT THE TIME EASTERN DATA WAS TABLED UNDER WESTERN PRESSURE, THE EAST STARTED MAKING EXPLICIT
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CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS MANPOWER PARITY IN THE AREA AND THEN CLAIMS THAT WESTERN DATA ON WARSAW PACT FORCES WAS DEFECTIVE. IT HAS NOW MOVED TO A POSITION OF DEMANDING THAT ITS TABLED DATA BE USED AS A BASIS FOR COMPUTING EASTERN REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND OF CLAIMING THAT DOING SO WILL RESULT IN PARITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER AT A LOWER LEVEL. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WESTERN FAILURE TO PRESS THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF EASTERN DATA WITH THE EAST WILL RESULT NOT ONLY IN WESTERN INABILITY TO PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN PROGRAM, BUT IN RELINQUISHING THE OVERALL INITIATIVE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO THE EAST.

----C. OBJECTIVES OF THE DATA DISCUSSION

-----4. THE OBJECTIVE OF DATA AND DEFINITION DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST IS TO ACHIEVE A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORCES THAT WILL BE COVERED BY AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

-----5. A NECESSARY INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE WEST TO OBTAIN A SPECIFIC PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER, A DESCRIPTION OF THE SPECIFIC POINTS WHERE

EASTERN DATA ON THE EASTERN FORCES DIVERGE FROM WESTERN ESTIMATES AND OF THE EXTENT OF THAT DIVERGENCE. ONCE SUCH A PROFILE IS ACHIEVED, IT WILL ENABLE MORE EFFECTIVE AND SPECIFIC WESTERN PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO ADMIT THE EXISTENCE OF THE DISPARITY.

-----D. NECESSARY NEXT STEPS

-----6. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A SPECIFIC PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AND EASTERN CLAIMS ABOUT WARSAW PACT FORCES, IT IS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN FROM

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THE EAST FURTHER QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION ABOUT EASTERN FORCES. THE DISCUSSION OF DATA WITH THE EAST IN VIENNA HAS ARRIVED AT A STAGE WHERE THE WEST HAS NOTHING TO GAIN FROM CONTINUING WITH QUESTIONS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE NEW INFORMATION FROM THE EAST OF A KIND WHICH CAN BE CHECKED AGAINST WESTERN INFORMATION ON EASTERN FORCES. ONE CANNOT COMPARE EASTERN VERBAL STATEMENTS WITH WESTERN NUMERICAL DATA ON EASTERN FORCES AND OBTAIN FROM THAT COMPARISON A PRECISE PICTURE OF WHERE THE DISPARITY IS LOCATED AND ITS EXTENT. THIS MEANS THE WEST MUST BRING THE EAST TO PROVIDE FURTHER NUMERICAL BREAKDOWNS OF EASTERN FORCES.

-----7. WESTERN INTELLIGENCE IS FOR THE MOST PART COLLECTED, ORGANIZED, AND ANALYZED ON A NATIONAL BASIS. TO ENABLE COMPARISON OF INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE EAST ON NGA WARSAW PACT FORCES WITH WESTERN INFORMATION ON EASTERN FORCES, THAT INFORMATION MUST HAVE THE SAME BASIS. THUS, IT IS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN EASTERN NATIONAL TOTALS AND THEN TO CONTINUE ON A NATIONAL BASIS TO CHECK DATA ON MAIN ORDER OF BATTLE COMPONENTS OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH AGAINST WESTERN DATA ON THE SAME FORCE COMPONENTS; FOR EXAMPLE, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET DIVISIONS AND THEIR TOTAL MANPOWER.

-----8. THIS PROCEDURE WILL ENABLE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS TO COMPARE EASTERN NUMERICAL REPLIES WITH THEIR OWN DATA ON EASTERN FORCES AND THUS TO OBTAIN A PRECISE PROFILE OF THE LOCATION AND EXTENT OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE EAST WISHES TO PROVE THE CORRECTNESS OF ITS OWN DATA AND THUS THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE IT TO ANSWER SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS. ALTHOUGH IT HAS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION, THE EAST MAY BLOCK THE PROCESS AT ANY POINT. BUT REFUSING TO ANSWER RELEVANT WESTERN REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION WOULD DISCREDIT THE VALIDITY OF ITS OWN DATA.

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-----9. TO OBTAIN THIS NEEDED INFORMATION FROM THE EAST, THE WEST MUST BE PREPARED TO ANSWER PARALLEL EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT SECURITY LOSS AS INDICATED IN THE NATO WORKING GROUP STUDY ON THIS TOPIC.

II. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

-----EIGHT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION ARE DISCUSSED BELOW. THEY ARE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

-----FIRST: HOW FAR WILL THE ALTERNATIVE ADVANCE THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING ADDITIONAL EASTERN DATA AND INFORMATION ABOUT THAT DATA

-----A. IN A FORM WHICH CAN BE COMPARED WITH INFORMATION NOW HELD BY THE WEST;

-----B. WHICH WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR MORE SPECIFIC WESTERN QUESTIONS AIMED AT DETERMINING THE REASON FOR DISCREPANCIES;

-----C. WHICH WILL ASSIST A WESTERN CHALLENGE OF EASTERN DATA IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO BRING THE EAST TO ADMIT SOME EXCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN MADE; AND

-----D. WHICH WILL ENABLE THE WEST TO COLLECT INFORMATION AS A BASIS FOR WESTERN DECISIONS ON STRATEGY?

-----SECOND: WILL IT HELP THE WEST REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE DEFINITION AND DATA DISCUSSION--THAT IS, IS THE EAST LIKELY TO AGREE TO A GIVEN ALTERNATIVE AND TO PRODUCE FURTHER DATA ON EASTERN FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THAT ALTERNATIVE AND IF NOT, CAN THE WEST THEN PLAUSIBLY
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ASSERT THAT THE ONUS FOR FAILING TO CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION RESTS WITH THE EAST?

-----THIRD: WILL RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR POSITION, IN EITHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY SECURITY TERMS?

-----A. SUSPEND DEFINITION AND DATA DISCUSSION INDEFINITELY OR POSTPONE TO A LATER ROUND

-----1. AS NOTED IN SECTION I, A COMMON EAST-WEST UNDERSTANDING ON DATA AND DEFINITIONS WILL ULTIMATELY BE NEEDED AS A BASE FOR CALCULATING REDUCTIONS AND

LIMITATIONS. BUT WITHOUT CONTINUATION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION, UNDERSTANDING CANNOT BE REACHED. CONSEQUENTLY, TO POSTPONE OR SUSPEND THE DISCUSSION MERELY POSTPONES THE MOMENT WHEN A WAY OF RESOLVING THE PRESENT EAST-WEST DISAGREEMENT WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND. IT DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE ULTIMATE NECESSITY OF DECIDING ON ONE OF THE CONCRETE

ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION DISCUSSED BELOW.

-----2. TO SUSPEND THE DATA DISCUSSION NOW WOULD LEAVE UNCHALLENGED THE EASTERN ASSERTION THAT PARITY IN THE AREA PRESENTLY EXISTS. THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION WILL INEVITABLY CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE

WEST LACKS CONFIDENCE IN ITS ASSERTIONS OF EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. MOREOVER, SUSPENSION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION BY THE WEST WILL NOT SILENCE THE EAST WITH REGARD TO DATA. TO THE CONTRARY, WESTERN SILENCE WILL CREATE IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EAST TO CONTINUE ITS PRESENT OFFENSIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PERMIT THEM TO ARGUE IN PUBLIC THAT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON EASTERN DATA WILL RESULT IN PARITY AT REDUCED LEVELS.

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-----3. THIS BEING THE CASE, THE WEST WOULD NOT ONLY LOSE THE HIGH GROUND IT HAS HAD ON DATA SINCE THE OUTSET BUT ALSO BE AT A CONSIDERABLE DISADVANTAGE WHEN THE DATA DISCUSSION EVENTUALLY RESUMED.

----B. CONTINUE A DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS BUT NOT OF DATA

-----4. SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS WILL ULTIMATELY BE NECESSARY TO INSURE THAT EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA ARE COMPARABLE AND FOR CRITERIA TO ENABLE THE WEST TO COMPLY WITH AND VERIFY MANPOWER CEILINGS. NONETHELESS, ADOPTION OF THIS COURSE WITHOUT FURTHER DATA DISCUSSION WOULD NOT PRODUCE FURTHER NUMERICAL INFORMATION FROM THE EAST WHICH CAN BE COMPARED WITH WESTERN DATA HOLDINGS. IT IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE MOVEMENT TOWARDS LOCATING THE DISCREPANCY OR TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE EASTERN FIGURES.

-----5. THE EAST WOULD MOST LIKELY MERELY REPEAT THE DEFINITIONS IT HAS ALREADY GIVEN US; E.G., ALL UNIFORMED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL. VERBAL EASTERN RESPONSES WILL NOT PRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL DATA ON EASTERN FORCES NEEDED FOR COMPARISON WITH WESTERN DATA HOLDINGS.

----C. TABLE UNILATERALLY US MANPOWER TOTALS AND THE WESTERN ESTIMATE OF SOVIET MANPOWER

-----6. THE WEST HAS ALREADY PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF US-SOVIET FIGURES WITHOUT SUCCESS. THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE EAST WOULD TABLE ITS DATA ON SOVIET FORCES IN RESPONSE TO SUCH A MOVE OR, EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE THE WEST WITH THE FURTHER BREAKDOWNS ON SOVIET FORCES WHICH WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A SPECIFIC PROFILE
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OF THE DISPARITY.

-----7. CONSEQUENTLY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT OPEN THE WAY TO CONTINUATION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION OR HELP US TO IDENTIFY THE BASIS FOR THE DISCREPANCY.

-----8. MOREOVER, AS THE US HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR, IT IS WILLING TO TABLE ITS DATA ONLY AS PART OF A PRE-AGREED SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE.

-----9. IN ADDITION, AS THE AHG HAS POINTED OUT, SUCH A POSITION WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND WITH THE PUBLIC AS A RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS.

-----D. EACH SIDE TABLE THE SUB-TOTALS CORRESPONDING TO ITS REDUCTION PROGRAM (I.E. TOTALS FOR US FORCES AND FOR THE TOTAL OF OTHER WESTERN FORCES BY THE WEST; NATIONAL TOTALS BY THE EAST).

-----10. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EAST WOULD REJECT SUCH A PROCEDURE. THE EAST HAS INSISTED THAT THE DISCUSSION BE CONDUCTED ON A BASIS OF STRICT RECIPROCITY. MOREOVER, THE WEST WOULD NOT BE OFFERING MORE THAN UNDER ITS PROPOSAL TO TABLE US-SOVIET FIGURES ONLY--A PROPOSAL THE EAST HAS ALREADY REJECTED.

-----11. THE PRINCIPAL DEFECT OF THIS COURSE IS THAT EVEN TO ADVANCE IT WOULD TIE THE DATA DISCUSSION DIRECTLY TO THE REDUCTION PROGRAM OF EACH SIDE, SOMETHING THE WEST HAS SOUGHT TO AVOID SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION. THIS IN ITSELF SEEMS A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT TO ESTABLISH. IT COULD IPSO FACTO PRECLUDE CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION IN ADVANCE--MOST NOTABLY THE TABLING OF NATIONAL TOTALS BY THE WEST AT SOME FUTURE DATE OR THE TABLING OF DATA ON UNITS BECAUSE THE WEST DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE
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OBLIGATORY REDUCTION BY UNITS.

-----E. OFFER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION GIVING THE NUMBER OF MAJOR UNITS AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL STRENGTHS, WITHOUT GIVING NATIONAL AFFILIATION OF THESE UNITS.

-----12WE DO NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF USING DATA ON UNITS IN A LATER STEP IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, A WESTERN EFFORT TO SKIP DIRECTLY TO INDIVIDUAL UNITS AND LOCATIONS WITHOUT FIRST EXCHANGING NATIONAL FIGURES, WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ELICIT A REFUSAL.

-----13. THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD GIVE THE EAST AN EASY OUT FOR STOPPING THE FLOW OF ITS INFORMATION, ONE WHICH WOULD NOT DISCREDIT TABLED EASTERN DATA, AS WOULD BE THE CASE IF THE EAST REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WHICH WERE RELEVANT.

-----14. THIS METHOD COMMITS THE WEST TO A HORIZONTAL ACROSS-THE-BOARD EXAMINATION OF ALL UNITS OF A CERTAIN TYPE IN THE FORCES IN EACH OF THE PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST TO CONCENTRATE ITS ENQUIRY ON THOSE NATIONAL FORCES WHERE THE BULK OF THE DISCREPANCY MAY LIE. A FULL PICTURE OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FORCES WOULD ONLY EMERGE AT THE VERY END OF THE PROCESS.

-----15. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALSO INVOLVE FORCE DEFINITION AND COMPARABILITY PROBLEMS.

----F. USE AS REFERENCE AN UNCLASSIFIED NATO PUBLICATION GIVING INTER ALIA NATIONAL FIGURES FOR NATO FORCES IN THE NGA

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-----16. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY ARTIFICIAL FOR NATO IN THE SPRING OF 1977 TO PUBLISH FORCE TOTALS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON NATO FORCES IN THE NGA AS OF A DATE FIFTEEN MONTHS EARLIER.

-----17. IF THE ACTION WOULD NOT BE RECIPROCAL, WE WOULD VIOLATE OUR PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES OF DATA. WE WOULD NOT BE GETTING EASTERN DATA IN RETURN. BUT WE COULD NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCITY SINCE THE EAST HAS NO PARALLEL WARSAW PACT PUBLICATION CHANNEL.

-----18. THIS WOULD BE AN ARTIFICIAL METHOD NOT EQUIVALENT TO TABLING FIGURES, AND WOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY THE EAST.

-----19. THE EAST WOULD OBJECT THAT THIS ACTION DOES

NOT REPRESENT TABLING OF FIGURES IN THE TALKS AND THAT THEY ARE NOT DEALING WITH NATO AS AN ORGANIZATION.

-----20. HENCE THE EAST WOULD NOT TABLE ITS NATIONAL FIGURES AND THE WEST WOULD BE BLOCKED IN THE DATA DISCUSSION.

-----21. MOREOVER, IF THIS METHOD WERE TRIED AND FAILED, THE FOCUS OF EAST-WEST DISAGREEMENT WOULD BE ON THE TOPIC OF TABLING NATIONAL DATA AND OUR OWN WESTERN ACTIONS WOULD HAVE EMPHASIZED WHAT WE MUST AVOID, THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION BECOMES DIRECTLY LINKED WITH REDUCTION APPROACHES.

----G. EACH SIDE TABLES NATIONAL MANPOWER TOTALS

-----22. PURELY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OBTAINING

FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT EASTERN FORCES AND DEFINITIONS AND IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY, THIS IS
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THE MOST LOGICAL NEXT STEP.

-----2.. WESTERN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF TOTAL WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA ARE BUILT UP ON THE BASIS OF TOTALS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY. THAT IS, WESTERN INTELLIGENCE ON WARSAW PACT FORCES IS ORGANIZED AND ANALYZED ON A NATIONAL BASIS. TO CHECK EASTERN STATEMENTS ABOUT DATA ON WARSAW PACT FORCES, WESTERN INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS MUST BE IN A POSITION TO CHECK THESE STATEMENTS AGAINST THEIR DATA ON THE FORCES OF EACH WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

-----24. TABLING SEPARATE FIGURES FOR WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THUS OBTAINING SEPARATE FIGURES FOR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL BEST ENABLE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS TO IDENTIFY THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISCREPANCIES AMONG VARIOUS EASTERN NATIONAL FORCES AND AS BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND.

-----25. TABLING OF SEPARATE TOTALS FOR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ENABLE THE WEST TO TEST SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THE EASTERN FIGURE FOR SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS NOT GREATLY DIFFERENT FROM THE WESTERN 1973 ESTIMATE FOR SOVIET GROUND FORCES (ADJUSTED TO ADD SOVIET ARMY AVIATION MANPOWER) AND THAT THE DISCREPANCY IS DISPROPORTIONATELY ALLOCATED AMONG THE FORCES OF EAST EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS.

-----26. IF DISCREPANCIES DO TURN OUT TO BE DISPROPORTIONATELY ALLOCATED TO CERTAIN PARTICIPANTS, THEN

THE WEST WOULD BE ABLE TO FOCUS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON THESE ANSWERS. A REFUSAL BY THE EAST TO ANSWER RELEVANT QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE AREAS WOULD CAST DOUBT ON EASTERN DATA AND WOULD TEND TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ON THE EAST.

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-----27. THE EAST'S TABLING OF SEPARATE FIGURES FOR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TIE THE EAST DOWN TO A SPECIFIC ALLOCATION OF ITS OVERALL TOTAL AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR IT TO EVADE WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THE INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF SPECIFIC GROUPS OF PERSONNEL.

-----28. DISCUSSION OF THE NATIONAL TOTALS WILL NOT NECESSARILY PROVIDE ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY. FURTHER POSSIBLE STEPS ARE DISCUSSED LATER IN THIS PAPER. HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY THROUGH TABLING OF TOTALS ON THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL

EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THAT WE WILL HAVE THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON ORDER OF BATTLE, TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANNING LEVELS WHICH WOULD BE THE KEY TO EXPLAINING DISCREPANCIES IN THE OVERALL TOTALS.

III. POSSIBLE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS

1. CONSIDERED FROM A PURELY METHODOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, THERE IS A CONVINCING CASE THAT THE TABLING OF NATIONAL TOTALS IS THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP, THOUGH NOT THE FINAL ONE, IN A PROCESS DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES, TO PROVIDE A CONVINCING BASIS FOR CHALLENGING THE EAST'S DATA, AND ULTIMATELY TO MOVE TOWARDS THE NECESSARY AGREEMENT ON DATA.

2. THE REAL ISSUE THEREFORE IS WHETHER TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS WOULD PREJUDICE THE WESTERN POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY.

3. THE CASE THAT IT WOULD PREJUDICE HOLDS (A) THAT THE TABLING OF NATIONAL TOTALS WOULD BE MERELY THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS IN WHICH DATA WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED
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ON NATIONAL LINES; (B) THAT DISCLAIMERS TO THE CONTRARY, THE EAST WOULD USE THE FIGURES AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR DISCUSSING REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS; (C) THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WOULD THEREBY BE WEAKENED, AND (D) THAT

TABLED NATIONAL DATA COULD BE USED BY THE EAST TO CHALLENGE WESTERN INCREASES PRIOR TO AN AGREEMENT.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST WILL ATTEMPT TO USE TABLED NATIONAL TOTALS TO SUPPORT ITS POSITION. THE ULTIMATE DEFENSE AGAINST THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS IS THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH THE WEST RESISTS THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS AND INSISTS ON THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE. DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS, THE WEST HAS SHOWN AN UNYIELDING FIRMNESS ON THIS POINT. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE EAST HAS BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE FIRMNESS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THIS RESISTANCE TO NATIONAL CEILINGS ON NON-US ALLIED FORCES CONSTITUTES A FIRM AND BASIC US POSITION IN MBFR.

5. THIS DETERMINATION, AND NOT THE WITHHOLDING OF NATIONAL TOTALS, IS THE REAL WESTERN DEFENSE AGAINST THE EASTERN POSITION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE TABLING OF A GENERAL DISCLAIMER ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD THEN GIVE THE WEST WHAT IT NEEDS TO CONTINUE EFFECTIVELY TO PRESS ITS POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY.

6. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN OVER THE LINKAGE, IMPLICIT OR DIRECT, WITH THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH THAT MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED BY THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS OR BY ITS PROPOSING SOME LESS PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE WAY OF CONTINUING THE DATA DISCUSSION. A WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO PUT FORWARD NATIONAL TOTALS COULD MERELY UNDERLINE ITS APPREHENSION THAT TO TAKE SUCH A STEP WOULD PREJUDICE ITS POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY AND THUS CREATE A LINKAGE WHERE NONE NEED EXIST. SUCH A POSTURE COULD ULTIMATELY BE MORE DAMAGING TO THE WESTERN
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POSITION THAN TABLING THE NATIONAL TOTALS WITH APPROPRIATE GENERAL DISCLAIMERS.

7. OTHER POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS REGARD HAVE TO DO WITH THE PAST RECORD OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. THE DATA DISCUSSION IN PAST ROUNDS HAS TAKEN PLACE UNDER A PRINCIPLE AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES, NAMELY, THAT IT SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITION OF EACH SIDE. MOREOVER, DURING THE PAST ROUND, THE WEST HAS BOTH POSED QUESTIONS ON THE NATIONAL FORCES OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON NATIONAL FORCES OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. IT HAS DONE SO ON THE ASSUMPTION GIVEN EXISTING DISCLAIMERS AND THE FIRMNESS OF ITS RESOLVE ON THE COLLECTIVITY ISSUE THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD NOT DAMAGE ITS POSITION. THIS IN FACT HAS BEEN THE CASE.

8. THE APPROACH DISCUSSED IN PARA II F ABOVE, OF USING AN UNCLASSIFIED NATO PUBLICATION AS A REFERENCE, IS NOT

SUPERIOR TO TABLING NATIONAL DATA IN PROTECTING THE WESTERN POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY. IN BOTH CASES, THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO VALIDATE AND DISCUSS NATIONAL FIGURES AND IN BOTH CASES THE WEST WOULD RELY PRINCIPALLY ON ITS ANNOUNCED REFUSAL EITHER TO CONSIDER NATIONAL LIMITS OF EUROPEAN FORCES OR TO RELATE THE DATA DISCUSSION TO OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION.

IV. LATER STEPS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION

-----1. ONCE THE WEST HAS EXCHANGED NATIONAL MANPOWER TOTALS WITH THE EAST, NATO WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT FURTHER STEPS WILL BE NEEDED.

-----2. ACCESS TO EASTERN NATIONAL TOTALS WILL BE VERY VALUABLE, BUT IN ITSELF, IT WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY IN DETAIL THE MAJOR SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCIES AND TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF OBTAINING A SPECIFIC PROFILE
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OF THESE DISCREPANCIES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT IS AN ESSENTIAL STARTING POINT.

-----A. PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN NEXT STAGE

-----3. AS THE NEXT STEPS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION, THEREFORE, WE PROPOSE THAT WESTERN NEGOTIATORS ASK DETAILED QUESTIONS ON A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS RELATING TO THE STRUCTURE OF EASTERN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA, STARTING WITH THE NUMBERS OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF UNITS (I.E. ARMY GROUPS, ARMIES, CORPS, DIVISIONS) OF EACH OF THE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA. THE WEST WOULD IN EACH CASE THEN ASK THE EAST TO GIVE THE TOTAL ACTUAL MANPOWER STRENGTH OF ALL UNITS OF THIS TYPE TAKEN TOGETHER.

-----4. WE PLAN TO FOCUS FIRST ON DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES FOR SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE POINT AT WHICH WE WOULD TURN TO EXAMINATION OF FIGURES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL NON-SOVIET EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF HOW THE DISCUSSION OF SOVIET FIGURES PROCEEDS.

-----5. WE WOULD BEGIN THIS PROCESS BY ASKING THE NUMBER OF GROUPS OF FORCES, ARMIES, CORPS, AND MANEUVER DIVISIONS (MOTORIZED RIFLE OR MECHANIZED INFANTRY, TANK OR ARMORED, ETC.) IN SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THE SOVIET MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE IN VIENNA HAS INDICATED BILATERALLY EASTERN READINESS TO SUPPLY INFORMATION ON DIVISIONS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

-----6. TO ILLUSTRATE, THE WEST COULD ASK A LINE OF QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS: (THE ORDER OF THESE QUESTIONS--

WHETHER WE GO FROM GROUPS TO DIVISIONS OR VICE VERSA--WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED LATER) (MCM-86-76 ESTIMATES IN PARENTHESES).

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-----A. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET GROUPS OF FORCES INCLUDED IN EASTERN FIGURES (3) (3: GDR; NORTHERN GROUP IN POLAND; CENTRAL GROUP IN CZECH.)

-----B. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET FIELD ARMIES (COMBINED ARMS OR TANK) INCLUDED IN EASTERN FIGURES? (5)

-----C. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ARMY CORPS INCLUDED IN EASTERN FIGURES (1)

-----D. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE AND TANK DIVISIONS INCLUDED IN EASTERN FIGURES? (27)

-----E. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE AND TANK DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO ARMIES AND CORPS (23)

-----7. EASTERN ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS WOULD BE USED TO CHECK ONE POSSIBLE SOURCE OF DISCREPANCY--THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF MAJOR UNITS IN THE SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE. THE ANSWERS ALSO WOULD PROVIDE A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR DISAGGREGATING MANPOWER FIGURES BELOW THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL TOTALS WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP DEFINITIONS OF GENERAL CATEGORIES (SUCH AS COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT) TO BE APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE FORCES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES.

-----8. IN SUM, EASTERN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON UNITS AND FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD PRODUCE A FRAMEWORK FOR DIVIDING SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER INTO THE FOLLOWING BLOCKS: (ROUNDED MCM-86-76 MANPOWER ESTIMATES IN PARENTHESES)

-----A. ALL UNITS IN THE GROUPS OF FORCES (476,000) SUBDIVIDED INTO

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-----1) TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS (303,000)

-----2) NON DIVISIONAL UNITS (174,000)

-----B. UNITS IN ARMIES AND CORPS (329,000), SUBDIVIDED INTO

-----1) TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS (260,000)

-----2) NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS (69,000)

-----C. UNITS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO GROUPS OF
FORCES HEADQUARTERS (148,000) SUBDIVIDED INTO:

-----1) TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS (43,000)

-----2) NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS (105,000)

-----9. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS COULD ALSO ASK THE EAST
FOR THE TOTAL ACTUAL MANPOWER STRENGTH IN EACH OF THE TYPES
OF UNITS SPECIFIED. IN EFFECT, THIS WOULD MEAN ASKING
THE EAST FOR THE MANPOWER FIGURES TO MATCH THE "BLOCKS"
DEVELOPED FROM EASTERN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON UNITS AND
FORCE STRUCTURE.

-----10. IF A SPECIFIC MANPOWER FIGURE WERE LESS THAN
THE WESTERN ESTIMATE, THE WEST WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER
ASKING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO GET THE EAST TO EXPLAIN THIS
DIFFERENCE.

-----11. INsofar AS SOVIET MANPOWER IS CONCERNED,
QUESTIONS ON NUMBERS OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS SUCH AS GROUND
DIVISIONS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT FOR DETERMINING

THE LOCATION OF POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES IN THE FIGURES OF
THE TWO SIDES ON SOVIET FORCES BECAUSE THE BULK OF THE
SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE AREA IS IN SUCH UNITS. OVER 60
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IS IN
DIVISIONS. UNLIKE THE FORCES OF INDIGENOUS COUNTRIES,
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THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE LARGE REAR ECHELON OR "NATIONAL
OVERHEAD" ELEMENTS IN THE AREA.

----- 12. THE NSWP COUNTRIES HAVE PROPORTIONATELY MUCH
LARGER NUMBERS OF MEN IN THE LESS VISIBLE REAR ECHELON
AND NATIONAL OVERHEAD COMPONENTS. FOR THE FORCES OF THESE
COUNTRIES, THE PROCESS DESCRIBED HERE WOULD PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR SEPARATING THAT PART OF THE DISCREPANCY IN
THOSE FORCE ELEMENTS MOST ACCESSIBLE TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE
FROM THAT PART OF THE DISCREPANCY IN THE LESS VISIBLE
COMPONENTS. IF THERE TURNED OUT TO BE AN INSIGNIFICANT
DISCREPANCY IN THE MAJOR COMBAT UNITS AND FORMATIONS, THE
WEST WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE BULK OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS
LOCATED AMONG THE LESS VISIBLE COMPONENTS. THE SHEER
SIZE OF SUCH A DISCREPANCY IN THESE ELEMENTS WOULD CAST
CONSIDERABLE DOUBT THAT THE EAST HAD USED THE SAME
COUNTING RULES USED BY THE WEST AND APPLIED THEM IN THE
SAME WAY.

----B. ALTERNATIVES

-----13. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED LINE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA DISCUSSION ARE MUCH LESS SATISFACTORY.

-----14. BASING WESTERN QUESTIONS ON CROSS-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL OR CROSS-NATIONAL FUNCTIONAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE EASTERN MANPOWER TOTAL, OR OF THE HON-SOVIET EASTERN MANPOWER TOTAL, WOULD RAISE DIFFICULT DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS, AND WOULD PRODUCE INFORMATION IN A FORM WHICH WOULD NOT BE USEFUL.

-----15. FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER THIS APPROACH WE WOULD HAVE NO WAY TO ASSURE OURSELVES THAT EASTERN COUNTRIES WERE USING TERMS SUCH AS "COMBAT FORCES", "SUPPORT FORCES",
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OR "AIR DEFENSE" UNIFORMLY, AND THAT FIGURES ON MANPOWER IN SUCH SUB-DIVISIONS REFLECTED COUNTING RULES APPLIED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE WEST HAS USED IN COUNTING EASTERN MANPOWER. QUESTIONING BASED ON NATIONAL BREAK-DOWNS APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY WAY TO ASCERTAIN THIS.

-----16. MOREOVER, TO BE USEFUL, INFORMATION PRODUCED BY QUESTIONING MUST BE IN A FORM WHICH IS COMPARABLE TO OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. THESE ARE

MADE UP SEPARATELY NATION BY NATION. THE FORCE STRUCTURES OF THE FOUR EASTERN COUNTRIES DIFFER AS TO ORDER OF BATTLE, TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, AND MANNING LEVELS. FOR EXAMPLE:

----- (A) THE EASTERN EUROPEANS HAVE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE AND THE SOVIETS DO NOT;

----- (B) POLAND HAS TERRITORIAL FORCES, THE OTHERS DO NOT;

----- (C) THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ARTILLERY DIVISION AND THE OTHERS DO NOT;

----- (D) THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED UNITS WHICH ARE NOT FOUND IN THE FORCES OF EACH OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES;

----- (E) TANK DIVISION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION MANPOWER RANGES FROM 8800 FOR ONE COUNTRY TO 10,200 FOR THE SOVIETS;
AND

----- (F) MANNING LEVELS ESTIMATES VARY FROM NEAR FULL STRENGTH TO 25 PERCENT.

ACCORDINGLY, EACH COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED
SEPARATELY.

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-----17. WE THEREFORE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, FROM A
TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE BREAKDOWN OF EACH NATION'S
TOTALS SEPARATELY INTO ITS FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL
ELEMENTS IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY OF CONSTRUCTING A
DETAILED PROFILE OF THE CLAIMED EASTERN MANPOWER
STRUCTURE AND OF UNAMBIGUOUSLY COMPARING THOSE CLAIMS
WITH OUR OWN ESTIMATES.

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